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The Repeal of
Rent Control

Cambridge

in

Robert

In the

P.

Moncreiff

November

8,

1994, state election, Massachusetts voters approved a question

placed on the ballot by

initiative petition

passing a law that effectively outlawed rent

had its most dramatic effect in Camwhere a stringent rent control system had been in effect since 1970. The success

control throughout the commonwealth. This law
bridge,

of the petition was realized primarily through the grassroots efforts of a coalition
of small-property owners in Cambridge who felt aggrieved by the city's rent control system.

The use of a statewide vote on an initiative petition to enact a law with predomiits proponents a variety of legal and political problems.

nantly local effect created for

These were overcome one by one through lawsuits and volunteer efforts
failure

was repeatedly averted by slender margins. This

article is

in

which

a detailed account

of that process.

Background
Rent control came to Cambridge in 1970 in the ferment of Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society.

cipal

The legendary

city councillor

opponent among Cambridge

and four-time mayor Edward A. Crane,

political figures, predicted that if the city

its

prin-

adopted

it would never get rid of it, and nearly a quarter of a century later there
seemed every reason to believe that Crane was right. At all times after its adoption, it
had the support of a majority of the city council. The city's traditional "good government" organization, the Cambridge Civic Association (CCA), whose endorsed candi-

rent control

dates regularly constituted a majority of that
for rent control a condition of endorsement.

body during the early 1990s, made support
The only significant change in the city's

rent control system as originally adopted, through an ordinance approved in 1979,

notably strengthened

buyer

who was

it

by providing that any

rental unit sold as a

condominium

to a

not the tenant on the effective date of the ordinance could not be occu-

pied by the owner, but must remain a rental unit subject to rent control.

A ballot question that would have relaxed this limitation on condominium conversion
was soundly defeated in the 1989 municipal election. A measure that imposed a surcharge on controlled rents to create a fund for improvements to substandard rental units
had the support of all but one city councillor in the spring of 1991, but was rescinded
Robert

P.

Moncreiff, a retired lawyer,

spent his entire legal career.
control to the

is

of counsel

to the

Boston firm of Palmer & Dodge LLP, where he has
City Council in 1970, he voted to bring rent

As a member of the Cambridge

city.
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summer when

CCA-endorsed councillors withdrew their support under
Then suddenly, at the end of 1994, rent control
Cambridge had known it was gone, repealed by a statewide vote on an initiative

that

the five

pressure from organized tenant groups.
as

petition. This article chronicles

The

how

that startling reversal

came

about.

in Cambridge called
Owners Association (SPOA). Native Cantabrigian David P. Sullivan

story begins with the formation in

the Small Property

and his wife, Aline, were instrumental

1987 of an organization

in this endeavor. Until the

mid-1980s they were

not personally affected by rent control, since the first-floor rental unit in their two-

family house on Huron Avenue in West Cambridge

Cambridge

rent control

came under an exemption

in the

law for units in an owner-occupied two- or three-family house.

In 1986, however, Sullivan bought from his elderly father three "ordinanced" con-

dominiums in a six-unit building on nearby Chilton Street, so described because they
were caught by the 1979 ordinance described above and could not be removed from
the rent control system.

A year later he petitioned the rent control board to recover possession of one of these
condominiums from the tenant so that it could be occupied by a daughter who was
about to be married. Sullivan was proceeding under a provision of the law permitting recovery of possession by the landlord for occupancy by himself or members of his
family. But the petition was denied on grounds that the Sullivans believed had no basis
in the law, and only after two years and substantial concessions to the tenant were they
able to recover possession. They came away from the experience with the clear impression that the law was being administered by a strongly pro-tenant staff that was hostile
to landlords.

The
ers in

view was shared by many small-property own-

Sullivans, soon finding that this

Cambridge, concluded

SPOA was

that these

owners should organize

to protect their rights.

Owners of buildings with twelve or fewer rental units were solicited for membership, and by degrees the list grew until by the early 1990s more than
a thousand members were paying modest dues to support a program of regular informational meetings, a monthly newsletter, and legal action on behalf of landlords.
Among the small-property owners who became active in the affairs of SPOA was
Denise Jillson, who played the central role in the repeal of rent control. Jillson grew up
and attended public schools in Somerville. In 1975 she married a Cambridge man and
moved with him to Maiden, where they began their family. Hoping that they could
someday live in Cambridge, in 1986 they were able to buy a four-family frame house
on Chester Street in North Cambridge, just off Massachusetts Avenue. The four units in
the result.

the house were subject to rent control, but Jillson and her

husband planned

to take

advantage of the provision in the law, noted above, allowing a landlord to recover
possession of a rental unit for his

own

use,

and

Like the Sullivans, they were frustrated by the

—

to

move

into the largest of the four units.

staff of the rent control

board and sub-

who, Jillson says, was herself renting
sleeping space in the unit to others
during which Jillson's family had to live with
relatives. Her frustration led to her participation in SPOA, and by 1992 Jillson was a co-

jected to a long delay

for the benefit of a tenant

—

chair of that organization.

We
in

of

must now meet another central figure in the story of the repeal of rent control
Cambridge, Jon R. Maddox, a lawyer in his early forties. Maddox, a graduate

Brown

University and the Suffolk

and practicing law
the unit

in a

some years

condominium

Law
at

School, in early 1993 was living with his wife

9 Ellery Street in Cambridge.

earlier without realizing that

118

it

He had bought

was an ordinanced condominium

that

could not be legally occupied by

he placed the unit

its

owner.

in a trust for the benefit

ship from occupancy. But he continued to
that in the aggregate far

exceeded the

When

he became aware of the problem,

of a family member, thus separating owner-

make mortgage payments and

maximum

permitted amount

could be rented under the rent control system, and he

knew

at

bear other costs

which the

unit

that his legal position

was

vulnerable.

Maddox's predicament, and the trust device employed to address it, were not uncomin Cambridge buildings, and in late 1992 the staff of the rent control board initiated
a campaign to identify ordinanced condominiums that were illegally occupied by their
owners and to enforce the law. Maddox himself was never challenged, but 9 Ellery
Street was known to be one of the buildings to be investigated, and he saw the handwriting on the wall. In March 1993 he attended a meeting of SPOA and shortly thereafter became a member.
At this time SPOA's principal activity, in addition to the regular informational meetings and newsletters, was the prosecution of a lawsuit the organization had filed a
year earlier in the Massachusetts Superior Court against the city of Cambridge and its
rent control board seeking to invalidate the rent control system on a variety of constitu-

mon

and other grounds. Maddox believed that

tional

in light of prior court decisions the

SPOA lawsuit

was hopeless, a view borne out by a Superior Court judge's dismissal of
most of the claims in March 1993. SPOA intended to appeal this decision, and Jillson
and the other SPOA leaders did not show much interest in Maddox's suggestion that the
most promising way to defeat rent control was to seek its repeal by a statewide vote
through the initiative procedure in the Massachusetts Constitution.

couraged to draft something

The Drafting and
The

if

he wished, which he promptly

set

He

was, however, en-

out to do.

Certification of the Initiative Petition

Initiative, that is, the

power of a specified number of

voters to submit laws to the

people for approval or rejection, has been part of the Massachusetts Constitution since
191 8.

'

It

has been used by activists on

affecting the

powers of

cities

many

and towns.

occasions to enact laws, some of them

A notable example was the

adoption in 1980

of so-called Proposition 272, placing a limitation on the taxes that can be assessed an-

The question obviously arises why
Cambridge or elsewhere to resort to this device
to repeal rent control. Part of the answer may he in the formidable logistical challenges
of gathering the requisite number of signatures to place a measure on the ballot and
to campaign for its adoption.
But the principal reason must be the instinctive sense of many lawyers and activists
that it would be incongruous, and must therefore be impermissible, to repeal a local
rent control system by a statewide vote of the people. Maddox did not have this mindnually on a municipality's real and personal property.

Jon

Maddox was

set.

He

the first person in

believed that the right of municipalities to maintain rent control systems

question of state policy that

may be

addressed

at

municipalities that have such a system. In drafting his initiative petition,
to

contend with language in the

is

a

any time, regardless of the number of

state constitution dealing

Maddox had

with the issue of localized ef-

but he was able to persuade both the Massachusetts attorney general and later,
on grounds that more accurately reflected his own views, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, that what he proposed was constitutionally permissible.
Before an initiative petition goes on the ballot, the state legislature is given the op-

fect,
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portunity to enact the law that the petition proposes, a requirement that affects the

procedures specified for

The

initiative petitions in the state constitution.

first

step

the

is

submission of the petition, signed by ten qualified voters, to the attorney general not
later
is

to

than the

first

Wednesday of the August before

which

the legislative session into

be introduced. For a measure to be considered by the legislature

in

1994

its

it

ses-

sion and, if not passed, to go on the ballot at the state election in that year, the deadline

was August 4, 1993.
Not every measure can be the subject of an

for submission

initiative petition;

a section of the consti-

tution specifies certain categories, called excluded matters, that cannot be.

of this

initial

submission

is

The purpose

to give the attorney general the opportunity to review

the petition to determine that

it is

in proper

form and contains no excluded matters.

If

the attorney general so concludes, he certifies his conclusion to the secretary of state

with the petition, which must be filed with the secretary not earlier than the

nesday in September, in

this case

attorney general, the petition

By

When
ting

it,

late

June of 1993, Jon

is

September

1,

not accepted for filing by the secretary of state.

Maddox had completed

a draft of an initiative petition.

he called the office of the attorney general to determine

how

to

go about submit-

he was referred to Peter Sacks, the assistant attorney general who handles

initiative petitions. In

general's office,

accordance with an informal procedure followed

Maddox was

filing deadline in order to obtain

cation of any legal problem that might prevent
sent such a draft to Sacks.

in the attorney

offered the opportunity to submit a draft of his pro-

posed petition before the August 4

The law

Rent Control Prohibition Act" and
is

Wed-

first

1993. Without the certification of the

that
its

it

its certification.

On

an advance indi-

Maddox

June 23,

proposed was entitled "The Massachusetts

operative section provided tersely, "Rent control

hereby prohibited in Massachusetts." Sacks reviewed the draft and advised

Maddox

Maddox's attention to the clause in
the excluded matters section of the constitution providing that no measure may be
particular
proposed by an initiative petition "the operation of which is restricted to
2
districts or localities of the commonwealth."
To understand the reasoning by which Sacks reached his conclusion, and the means
by which Maddox met his objections, we must go back to the principles that govern the
legal relationship between the commonwealth of Massachusetts on the one hand and
its constituent municipalities
the cities and towns
on the other. For most of the life
of the Massachusetts Constitution that relationship was governed by what lawyers
know as Dillon's rule, a principle named after the author of a famous treatise on municipal law which, briefly stated, holds that a municipality has no power to make laws
except such powers as have been granted to it by the state. A state statute granting such
a power is called an enabling act or enabling legislation.
In 1966 the constitution was amended to modify Dillon's rule in part by giving
Massachusetts cities and towns the power to make many kinds of laws without enabling
legislation
called home rule power
but some categories of law remained subject
to Dillon's rule, among them any "private or civil law governing civil relationships
that

he did not believe

it

could be

certified, directing

.

—

except as an incident to an exercise of an independent municipal power." 3
early legal questions raised

whether

this

.

—

—

—

.

when

murky exception

that state enabling legislation

rent control

to the grant of

was needed

to

came

home

to Massachusetts in

rule

powers

One

of the

1970 was

to municipalities

meant

permit municipalities to enact rent control

laws. In a case decided in that year involving the validity of a rent control ordinance

adopted by the town of Brookline without enabling legislation (Marshal House,

120

Inc.

v.

&

Rent Review

Supreme
and

Grievance Board of Brookline, 357 Mass. 709), the Massachusetts

Judicial Court ruled that enactment of rent control

that state enabling legislation

was required

to authorize

was not a home

rule

power

it.

Later in 1970 the Massachusetts legislature passed an enabling act setting forth a
scheme of rent control that any municipality could adopt. Cambridge, Brookline,
and Boston, among other municipalities, promptly adopted this scheme, but the 1970

enabling

with a limited

act,

life,

expired in 1976.

Any

municipality wishing to maintain

would have to obtain its own enabling act. Cambridge, Brookline, and Boston did so, and in 1993 all of them had rent control systems, though those
in Brookline and Boston had been much weakened by "vacancy decontrol" provisions
exempting a covered unit from the system after the tenant has moved out. The town of
Amherst had a system of rent review, and the cities of Lowell, Waltham, and Somerville
had enabling legislation authorizing them to enact rent control but had no system in
rent control thereafter

place.

So

when Jon Maddox

as things stood

tive petition in

sent Peter Sacks his first draft of an initia-

June 1993, the prohibition of rent control that

it

contained would have

changed the rules for these seven municipalities but not for any others, for

in the ab-

sence of enabling legislation and under the Marshal House case they were already prohibited from having rent control. Sacks believed that the limited effect of the

Maddox

mere seven municipalities in Massachusetts was fatal under the exclusion from
the initiative process of any measure restricted to particular localities. The Maddox draft
draft to a

recited, as

Maddox

strongly believed, that "rent control

cern," but Sacks did not agree that this
It is

overcame

the genius of his accomplishment that

conclusion the means for reversing

without such enabling legislation,

Obtaining a

list

If

is

a matter of statewide con-

local effect.

Maddox saw

344 of the

Maddox would

state's

draft a

in the

351

reason for Sacks's

cities

and towns were

law that gave

it

to them.

of the states that had statutes relating to rent control, he began to

through them seeking a model.
the others on the

on

it.

its

list,

He found

4

it

does not prohibit local rent control

comb

most of

in Florida. That state, unlike

entirely, but places severe re-

must be approved by the voters of a local entity
after a public hearing by its governing body followed by a finding that there exists
"a housing emergency so grave as to constitute a serious menace to the general public."
It must terminate in a year unless extended after a new hearing, finding, and vote.
strictions

its

adoption and content.

It

Units in luxury apartment buildings, defined as those with units whose average rent

on January

1,

1977, was more than $250, must be exempt.

Florida model, with
rent control

some

Maddox would

use the

additions and refinements of his own, to propose a limited

system available

to all Massachusetts municipalities, but prohibiting

any

other form of rent control.

Maddox submitted

three successive drafts to Sacks.

The

first

closely copied the

Florida model but added the further requirement of a prior finding by the state legislature of an extreme statewide housing emergency.
draft,

posed enabling

act

legislative action,

draft took a

new

part of property

of

We do not have his

response to

this

but Sacks perhaps pointed out that this added precondition would prevent the pro-

comment by

from conferring any new powers on municipalities

until further

and thus would make no immediate change in the law. The second

tack, authorizing local rent control, but only if

owners

is entirely

"compliance on the

voluntary and uncoerced." Again there

Sacks, but this draft raises the question whether the law

authorize, wholly lacking in coercive effect even for a limited period,

121

is

it

is

no record

purports to

a law at

all.
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which with a few minor word changes became the law prowas sent to Sacks on July 14. Its title, the Massachusetts
Rent Control Prohibition Act, left no doubt of its purpose, but it enabled any city or
town to adopt rent control on the conditions that (1) after six months from the date of
adoption, compliance by property owners was to be voluntary, (2) any rental unit owned
by a landlord who owns fewer than ten units or having a fair market rent of more than
$400 a month was to be exempt, and (3) a municipality imposing such regulation was to
compensate owners of controlled units from its general funds for the difference between
the controlled rents and the fair market rents of such units. Any other form of rent con-

Maddox's

posed by the

final draft,

initiative petition,

Massachusetts was prohibited. 5

trol in

Sacks was
conferred on

now
all

tentatively persuaded that the operation of the proposed law, since

Massachusetts municipalities

new powers, however

not be restricted to particular localities of the commonwealth, and he advised
that, subject to

comments from opponents, he believed
general. Maddox reported this fact to SPOA's

considering

it

it

would

limited,

Maddox

could be cer-

leaders and asked
by the attorney
them to see to the collection of the ten signatures needed for filing. He expressed
the hope that the signatures would come from a wide geographical area so as to lend
color to the proposed law's statewide application, but the time was short, so the signatories
there were, fortunately for the proponents as it turned out, twelve of them
who included David and Aline Sullivan and Denise Jillson, were all from Cambridge
and all active in SPOA. The initiative petition was filed with the attorney general on
tified

—

—

August
It is

4,

1993.

the policy of the attorney general's office before certifying an initiative petition

to solicit

comments from organizations likely to be opposed. Accordingly, on August 4
was distributed to the Cambridge Rent Control Board, the Campaign for

the petition

Affordable Housing and Tenant Protections, a Cambridge-based activist tenant organization, the

Boston Rent Equity Board, Greater Boston Legal Services, the Massachusetts

Tenants Organization, the Brookline Rent Control Board, and the Massachusetts

Reform

Institute.

zations responded. All the replies insisted that the proposed law
effect

Law

Written comments on the petition were invited, and four of the organi-

and therefore ran afoul of the particular

would have only

local

Sacks had

localities limitation that Peter

Only one of the responses, from longtime Cambridge tenant
Noble and Michael Turk on behalf of the Campaign for Affordable

originally thought fatal.
activists

William

J.

Housing and Tenant Protections, addressed at any length the significance of the limited
rent regulation system that the proposed law authorized for municipalities. It called this
system "unworkable and meaningless" and commented that
that these provisions
ties'

were included

.

"it is

tempting to conclude

only to evade the 'particular
true,

districts

the operation of

which

is

and

On August 19, after reviewing the comments
date we are not persuaded that the proposed law

limited to particular cities and towns

does confer some legal authority on

locali-

but Sacks was not convinced that

to his legal analysis.

opponents, he advised that "to

.

.

.

[since]

it

it

of the

one

is

apparently

and towns that they do not now enjoy.
town would actually choose to accept the proevery city or town would gain the power to do

cities

.

.

.

asserted unlikelihood that any city or

posed law does not change the
so."

.

exemption." This was, of course, perfectly

was relevant

The

.

On September

1,

fact that

1993, on Sacks's recommendation, attorney general Scott Harsh-

barger certified the petition, and on the same date

There was a near
state,

it was filed with the secretary of state.
Under the procedures of the secretary of
required on an initiative petition must be accompanied

crisis at the

each of the ten signatures

time of

filing.

122

by a certificate from the local election officials, in this case the Cambridge election
commission, establishing that the signer is a registered voter; and the signer must have
written his or her name "substantially as registered." When Denise Jillson and Jon

Maddox appeared

at the office

seventeenth floor of the

of the elections division of the secretary of state on the

McCormack

Boston on the morning of September

state office building at
1,

One Ashburton

Place in

1993, with the petition to be filed, they did

not have a certificate in support of the signature of one of the twelve signers, so
not accepted. Another signer, registered to vote under the

name

it

was

Elizabeth A. O'Connell,

had signed the petition Ann O'Connell, and her signature was disallowed. The other
ten signatures

was a tense moment. It was SPOA's introduction to
met to place a law on the ballot by inwas also the first of many close calls in a process, lasting more than
of emotion for Jillson, Maddox, and their SPOA colleagues as they

were

in order, but

it

the highly technical requirements that must be
itiative petition. It

year, that

was

full

a

moved through one crisis after another before achieving final success early in 1995.
Jon Maddox had every reason to be pleased. He had understood from the beginning
the political danger inherent in salvaging his petition by casting

enabling

act: if it

it

in the

form of an

authorized municipalities to adopt a rent control program with teeth,

landlords and other opponents of rent control in cities and towns where there

could be expected to oppose

it.

tionally sufficient an authorization of rent control that

danger had been avoided. But

The

this

was subject

it

rent control at

all, this

a countervailing risk.

to judicial review.

Cambridge tenant

ac-

William Noble and Michael Turk had called the petition's rent control system

"meaningless."

ceded

was hardly

circumstance carried with

attorney general's certification

tivists

was none

Because the attorney general had accepted as constitu-

that this

Many

lawyers, including those against rent control, would have con-

was not a

frivolous criticism. If the Massachusetts

Court could be persuaded of the validity of
the attorney general
certification

was challenged, however,

without addressing

this characterization,

would have been achieved

at the cost

Supreme Judicial
Maddox's success with

of ultimate failure.

When

the

the court sustained the attorney general's action

this issue at all.

The Signature Drive
The next phase in the effort to place a law on the ballot by initiative petition is gathering
the requisite number of signatures of registered voters for filing with the secretary of
state. That number is specified in the Massachusetts Constitution as "three per cent of
the entire vote cast for governor at the preceding biennial state election." 6 For measures

number was 70,286. A further
more than one-fourth of these signatures
can come from any one county. This provision imposed a limit of 17,571 on the number
of signatures from a single county that could be counted toward the required total. The
signatures must be filed with the secretary of state not later than the first Wednesday in
December
in 1993 it was December 1.
The period between the first Wednesday in September, when the petition is filed
with the secretary of state, and the first Wednesday in December, when the supporting

to appear

on the

ballot in the

1994

state election the

constitutional requirement provides that not

—

signatures

must be

filed, is thirteen

that time to collect signatures.

The

weeks. But the proponents do not really have
initiative petitions

on which the signatures are

all

col-

must first be printed in a form approved by the secretary of state. It was September 10, 1993, more than a week after the September 1 filing date, when the printed
lected
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ready. Before the signatures are filed with the secretary of state, they

certified

by

local election officials as

conforming

to the voter registration rec-

ords in the cities and towns in which the signers are registered to vote.

purpose signatures must be submitted to these

that for this

The law provides

officials not less than four-

teen days (ten days in the case of Boston) before the last day for filing with the secretary of state.

When

the delay for printing petitions and the deadline for submitting signa-

tures to local officials are taken into account, the proponents of the rent control petition

had

little

more than nine weeks

SPOA was
the purpose;

it

weekend

it

got started.

tion of the petition

It

had raised no money for

A

activists

and the beginning of the signature drive and solicited money and

A political

committee, the Massachusetts

throughout the campaign as

MHC, was

Homeowners

Coalition, referred to

formed and registered with the

state office of

make expenditures, and conduct
as cochair of SPOA to become its chairman, and
and signer of the petition, became its treasurer.

political finance to receive contributions,

the campaign. Denise Jillson resigned

Salim Kabawat, a former
It is

to collect the necessary signatures.

SPOA's ongoing program. But over the 1993 Labor Day
mailing to the SPOA membership announced the certifica-

regularly conducted

campaign and

which

had no office space and no volunteers beyond the dozen or so

who had

volunteers.

in

woefully unprepared to meet this challenge.

SPOA chair

evidence of the strong libertarian strain in the campaign, deriving from the

We Stand America 1992 presidential candidacy of Ross Perot, that names like
American Dream and Let Freedom Ring were considered for the political committee
during a long evening meeting in Jillson's kitchen before the more descriptive and politically effective if less exotic Massachusetts Housing Coalition was agreed upon. This
decision was made on the advice of Dennis Dyer, a consultant based in Beverly, Massachusetts, who had volunteered to help organize the signature effort in the hope, later
realized, that his firm, Northeast Legislative Strategies, would be retained to direct the
campaign for votes if the petition got on the ballot.
By mid-September the MHC had rented office space on the second floor of a storefront at 2000 Massachusetts Avenue in North Cambridge, set up its first conference
table
two wooden doors laid on sawhorses
and with its first volunteers mailed to
every SPOA member a form of petition with instructions for obtaining signatures. By
the end of September this naive beginning and MHC's other preliminary efforts had produced only a few hundred signatures. A mailing of petitions to all the members of the
Massachusetts Rental Housing Association, a statewide organization of landlords with
which SPOA had long-standing contacts, and the activities of a mushrooming corps
of volunteers throughout the state had by the second week of October brought this total
to only about 4,000. This was plainly insufficient progress, and Jillson knew that the
effort needed professional help. She sought it from National Voter Outreach (NVO), an
organization based in Carson City, Nevada, whose marketing flier had arrived unsolicited. She persuaded NVO to send, at its own expense, two representatives to Cambridge on October 11; a week later it became the professional adviser to the signature

United
the

—

—

drive.

MHC raised some $70,000 in cash from its inception through the end of 1993, but
at this early stage

to the

it

could not afford to retain

NVO.

For

this

purpose

it

had

organized real estate industry in Massachusetts. Jillson had earlier

to

made

look
contact

with Robert L. Nash, executive vice president of the Massachusetts Association of
Realtors, the real estate industry's statewide organization, and

124

Edward Shanahan, Nash's

counterpart at the Rental Housing Association, an arm of the Greater Boston Real
Estate Board. Both

men had

expressed sympathy with the

MHC

effort, but neither

offered help.

The

fact is that the Massachusetts real estate industry, while solidly

control,

was

sequences

MHC's

skeptical that

if it failed.

The

effort could

opposed

to rent

succeed and fearful of the possible con-

effects of rent control

had been

Boston

largely neutralized in

and Brookline by vacancy decontrol, and the industry was resigned to accepting

its

con-

Cambridge and trying to live with it. A failed campaign, the industry feared,
sleeping
dogs and create a threat of rent control in municipalities where no
might raise
such threat existed. Therefore the industry was not eager to be visibly associated with
MHC's efforts. On the other hand, the industry felt an obligation to show some support.
Dennis Dyer, who was involved in other potential ballot questions in collaboration with
tinuation in

NVO,

took advantage of

sentiment and arranged for

this

Greater Boston Real Estate Board and

paid $25,000 to

The

its

NVO to contract with the

Rental Housing Association, each of which

NVO for providing volunteer training and other services to MHC.

principal contribution to the training of volunteers

was simple but

effective.

MHC had recruited hundreds of volunteers and sent them out to collect signatures, but
many

of them had not learned to avoid the entirely natural temptation of falling into

lengthy explanation, and sometimes debate, of rent control with potential signers

"educating the public," Jillson calls

it.

NOV taught that to obtain

quired numbers this temptation must be avoided.
initiative petition

Many

—

signatures in the re-

voters are willing to sign an

simply to put an issue on the ballot for the voters to decide. Solicitors

must take advantage of

this willingness

and spend no more than a minute or two with

each prospect.
Volunteers were also trained in the importance of confining the signers of any one
petition to voters in a single municipality to facilitate the local certification of signatures
that

is

necessary before they can be filed with the secretary of

working, say,

at

from only three or four municipalities might

collect

many

without mixing voters from more than one city or town.

working

at a regional

A skillful volunteer

MHC,

signatures

A less

on each

petition

skillful collector or

one

shopping mall might avoid mixing only by using a separate peti-

tion for each signature.

exhausted.

state.

a town fair or a supermarket whose location attracts shoppers largely

at its

The 25,000

own

petitions originally provided

by the

state

were soon

expense, reprinted petitions several times.

In addition to training volunteers, National Voter Outreach brought to the drive the
established technique of paying people to collect signatures. Recruited through news-

paper ads, which invited interested persons to appear
fied times, they
to a

ture

were given

petitions

at

campaign headquarters

and clipboards and dispatched

shopping mall or other promising venue. Collectors received

—a

dollar in the drive's final stages

each signature collected.

at speci-

— often driven —

fifty cents

per signa-

— and NVO received a commission

for

MHC supplemented these efforts by recruiting, through em-

to work on weekends. Unlike NVO's
which was underwritten by the real estate industry, all the
costs of the paid collectors, including NVO's commissions, were paid by MHC. Jillson
estimates that as many as a third of the signatures collected in the drive were obtained
by paid collectors.
The results of NVO's training and techniques became apparent only gradually, and
in late October the prospects for success remained dim. Jillson remembers driving back

ployment agencies, additional paid collectors
fee for training volunteers,
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—
—

Cambridge alone on a dismal October night
after an appearance on a radio talk
show in a town near the Rhode Island border
overwhelmed by the sense that there
was no way to reach the goal. "I could have cried a river," she says. But like a good
commander, she did not betray her pessimism to her troops. And gradually, with growing momentum, then dramatically as the filing date approached, things improved.
to

We must imagine
in the

morning

Jillson's

key

a campaign headquarters frantic with activity every day from nine

until after

staff.

eleven

After she

at night,

supervised at

came home from her

all

times by one or more of

full-time job

and fed her family, she

was there every evening until eleven as well as all day long every weekend. The staff
was supported by a cadre of volunteers working from lists of sites and events
fairs
and the like
where voters congregate in large numbers, dispatching volunteers, paid

—

—

and unpaid,

with petitions, clipboards, and instructions, later receiving

to these places

them back. The

signatures

had

to

be counted and the petitions segregated,

first

by

municipality to facilitate submission for local certification, then by county to monitor

compliance with the county distribution

rule.

Denise Jillson was the unquestioned leader of and inspiration for

this effort. At
November, with little more than a week remaining
before signatures had to be dispatched to cities and towns for local certification, she
took some accrued vacation days to devote full time to the effort. She also moved the
headquarters across Massachusetts Avenue to the offices of Thayer & Associates on
the fifth floor of the building at number 2067. She did this because she had become uneasy about the activities of National Voter Outreach, which was paying collectors to
obtain signatures for other campaigns as well as MHC's under circumstances that made
it difficult to tell whose campaign funds were being used to pay for what signatures;
and because she knew and trusted Douglas Thayer. Thayer is a co-owner with his father
of Thayer & Associates, a real estate firm that manages in and around Boston some

the beginning of the second

thirty properties containing

week

in

approximately 2,000 rental units.

One of the

properties

brick building located at 3-5-7 Arlington Street at the corner of Massachusetts

—

—a

Avenue

Cambridge
is owned by the Thayer family. It was, of course, subject to rent conand Thayer had a long history as an active industry opponent of the Cambridge system. He had learned of the SPOA initiative petition when Jillson announced it in early
August on David Brudnoy's radio show, and that very night had called Jillson offering
to help. She turned to him for the initial financial contribution to start the signature
effort and for advice along the way. From the day in November when the Massachusetts
Housing Coalition headquarters was moved into his offices, he became a day-to-day parin

trol,

ticipant in

Many

MHC's

citizens

do not sign

efforts,

second in importance only to

do not know how, or even

if,

petitions "substantially as registered." Others believe they are registered

but have failed to change their registration after
district

Jillson.

they are registered to vote, and therefore

moving from one

municipality, or one

within a municipality, to another. For any of these reasons, local registrars

may fail to certify a signature. All organizations experienced in initiative campaigns
know that signatures are lost during the certification process, and they compensate by
gathering many more than are needed. A minimum rule of thumb is 20 percent more.
With 70,286 certified signatures required, not more than 17,571 of which could come
from a single county, Jillson knew she needed at least 85,000 signatures; she wanted
90,000 to 95,000 to be safe. By Sunday, November 14, only three days before the
deadline for transmitting signatures for certification, the campaign had collected about
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80,000. Jillson remembers spending that afternoon with Thayer and a few others in

—

—

quiet, because all the volunteers were out collecting signatures
where
they were, regretting the time lost before signing on XVO and
worrying about
various other what ifs," experiencing acute uncertainty and apprehension as the roller
coaster ride of the past weeks approached its end, waiting nervously for the results
of the day"s efforts to come in from the volunteers. She remembers, too, the excitement

Thayer's office
i:

of that Sunday evening as volunteer after volunteer brought in petitions bearing signa-

ended near midnight, totaled more than 8,000. Jillson knew
campaign was back in business.
Monday and Tuesday of the following week were spent in organizing and packaging
the petitions for transmission to cities and towns throughout Massachusetts. Those
tures that, as the counting

that the

which were
sent

by

to

go

municipalities

where few signatures had been collected were

to distant municipalities

mail, with a return

stamped self-addressed envelope. Those for the

were organized

into routes, to be delivered

on Wednesday

larger

in trucks

and

automobiles driven by volunteers. These routes had to be retraced days later to pick

up the

certified petitions

and bring them back

until the

following Monday.

to

where delivery for

lection continued in Boston,

November

22.

At

Cambridge. Meanwhile, signature col-

was not required

local certification

the end of that

week

the municipalities

from which certified petitions had not been returned were identified and the retrieval
process was completed. By Wednesday. December 1. the deadline for filing the certified
signatures with the secretary of state, all the petitions had been assembled and arranged
by municipality and county, and that afternoon a caravan of volunteers, led by Jillson.
took them to Boston and filed them. The afternoon ended at the Golden Dome, a bar
near the State House, where Jillson and her troops toasted the results of their efforts and
celebrated the camaraderie that had developed among them.
Jillson knew that it would be close, but she thought they had enough signatures. The
office of the secretary of state has, of course, no basis for questioning the validity of

any

certified signature, but

it

does review the certification method.

Its

rules then re-

quired that three or more registrars from each city or town sign the certification: signa-

by fewer than three were not accepted. Registrars are required to indicate
number of names certified on each petition. The secretary of state's office does not
review this arithmetic in detail, but if it is apparent on cursor}" examination that the total
recorded on a single petition plainly exceeds the number of signatures on the petition,

tures certified

the

the total

is

Of the

revised accordingly.

signatures filed. 73.769 were

cess of the 70,286 needed. But the

Middlesex counties exceeded the
distribution rule

by 2,300 and

acknowledged as received, comfortably in exnumbers of signatures received from Suffolk and

maximum

of 17,571 allowable under the county

1,543. respectively, a total of 3,843. This

number

of allowable signatures

allowed.

MHC had fallen 360

from

the 73.769

acknowledged

signatures short of the required number.

1993. Denise Jillson was formally notified of this fact by John

reduced the

as received to

P.

69.926

On December

7,

Cloonan. the direc-

tor of elections in the office of the secretary of state.

Soon

after the shortfall

became known.

Jillson received a telephone call

from

Barbara Anderson, whose organization. Citizens for Limited Taxation, has been through
several initiative petition campaigns.
are

common when

twenty

in

1993

—

signatures for

Anderson knew

many

that mistakes

initiative petitions

—

there

are presented for certification in a short period,
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by

local registrars

were more than
and she thought
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MHC was close enough to justify legal action to validate additional signatures.
advised Jillson to consult William A. McDermott,

Jr.,

a Boston lawyer

who

has

She

made

a specialty of election laws and procedures.

A meeting was promptly arranged with McDermott, who confirmed Anderson's view
that litigation

had a good chance of success.

On December

15, 1993,

he

filed in the

Massachusetts Superior Court in Boston, on behalf of Jillson and the nine other original
signers of

MHC's

initiative petition, a

complaint against the Massachusetts secretary

of state alleging that enough signatures had been wrongly denied certification to over-

come

Two

the shortfall.

days

later,

filed suit in the

the secretary of state in opposition to the Jillson
solidated, and the legal battle

from
same court to intervene on behalf of
plaintiffs. The two suits were con-

a group of eleven rent control supporters

Cambridge, Boston, and Brookline

was joined.

In litigation to establish the validity of disallowed signatures, the plaintiffs have an

important procedural advantage. In a case decided in 1976 relating to the attempt of

Eugene McCarthy

to appear

on the Massachusetts

president of the United States (McCarthy

v.

ballot that year as a candidate for

Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass.

Supreme Judicial Court ruled that if signatures in excess of
number have been filed with municipalities for certification, the Massachusetts secretary of state has the burden, when the proponents claim that a noncertified
signature should have been certified, of establishing that certification was rightly denied,
even though the secretary played no role in the original certification decision. To capitalize on this advantage, the Jillson plaintiffs had to identify uncertified signatures
for which the secretary could not accomplish this burden in sufficient numbers to over667), the Massachusetts

the required

come

the shortfall. In the meantime, their opponents were free to try to increase the

shortfall

by persuading the court

improperly

to disallow signatures

on the ground

that they

had been

certified.

To accomplish

MHC again drew upon the resources of its volunteers. A

this task,

copying machine was brought to the office of the secretary of

state,

and

all

the petitions

originally filed locally for certification outside Suffolk and Middlesex counties

were

copied, front and back, and segregated by cities and towns. Petitions from municipalities

having substantial numbers of uncertified signatures were assigned to volunteers, whose
job

became

it

to obtain lists of registered voters

and painstakingly compare them with

disallowed signatures to establish a basis for asserting that the disallowance was not justified.

was

Telephone books and

illegible, or

city directories

were also consulted, and where a signature

an address did not correspond to the voting

list,

signers

were called by

telephone to establish that they had signed properly. Affidavits to that effect were prepared, and volunteers were dispatched to arrange to have

them

signed.

The

of these efforts were brought to McDermott's office for evaluation and,

if

results

appropriate,

for filing in court.
Trial of the case before

Judge Martha B. Sosman did not begin

1994, but meanwhile the Jillson plaintiffs

provides that

been
is

to

when

the required

won

until

February 28,

an important procedural victory. The law

number of signatures on an initiative petition have
on the first Wednesday in December, the petition

filed with the secretary of state

be sent

to the legislature at the

the legislature

may

begin

its

had been advised on December
ficient signatures

had been

January the Jillson

7,

filed,

plaintiffs

beginning of

its

term the following January so that

deliberation on the law proposed

by the

petition. Jillson

1993, that the secretary, having determined that insuf-

would not send the

petition to the legislature. In early

asked Judge Sosman to order the secretary to do
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so,

and on

January 7 she issued such an order, ruling that

and that the Jillson

would not prejudice

it

the opposition

had already established a likelihood of success

plaintiffs

in the litiga-

The petition was thus before the legislature for consideration in the normal course.
The eight- week trial that began on February 28, during which Judge Sosman ruled on

tion.

hundreds of signatures that the Jillson

claimed should have been certified and

plaintiffs

hundreds more that their opponents claimed should not have been, was contentious.

Both

most dramatic episode, the

sides hired handwriting experts. In perhaps the

plaintiffs offered into

several signatures in Quincy,
forgeries,

Jillson

evidence an affidavit of their expert stating that in his opinion

which had been correctly identified by the opponents

had been forged by one of the eleven persons appearing

trial

ended on April 22, 1994, when Judge Sosman, having found

tiffs

had established signatures exceeding the required number by 34 and

as

The

in opposition.

that the Jillson plain-

that the op-

ponents had no further signatures to challenge, entered judgment in favor of the Jillson
plaintiffs.

The opponents

filed

an appeal, but

1995, legislation was enacted that

made

it

had not been heard when,

the case academic.

in

January

The Massachusetts Housing

overcome another obstacle.
The Massachusetts Constitution provides that if the legislature does not enact the
proposed law before the first Wednesday in May (in 1994 this was May 4, and the legislature did not do so), the proponents may complete action on the petition by filing
with the secretary of state not later than the first Wednesday of July
July 6 in 1994
additional signatures of qualified voters "equal in number to not less than one half
Coalition had, again by the slimmest of margins,

—

—

of one per cent of the entire vote cast for governor at the preceding biennial state elec7

tion." In

1994

this

the experienced

number was

11,714.

The

signatures were quickly collected

MHC volunteers and filed on July

that the signature requirement

had been

1

.

On

that

day

Jillson

was

by
notified

satisfied.

The Appeal from the Attorney General's

Certification

Ordinarily, filing the second round of signatures completes the requirements for get-

on the ballot. But nothing was ordinary in the Massachusetts
Housing Coalition's experience, and there remained an additional hurdle for the organization. This was the defense of an appeal, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court on
March 8, 1994, by the city of Cambridge and six of its registered voters, challenging the
ting an initiative question

legality of the attorney general's certification of

MHC's

petition. Jillson

and the other

nine original signers of the petition joined the case as intervenors.

Incensed that the city should be supporting the litigation with taxpayer money,

MHC

manager Robert W. Healy and tell him so. The legal
issue had been settled by the attorney general, they argued, and it was unfair for the city
to force MHC, already bearing the legal expense of the signature litigation and facing
the cost of a statewide ballot campaign in the fall, to incur further legal expense to
defend a point it regarded as settled. Healy replied that he thought the city had the duty
sent a delegation to

meet with

city

to test the legality of a certification decision that

which had been

at the heart

might overturn the rent control system

of the city's housing policy for more than twenty years.

Since the facts in the case were not in dispute,

it

was submitted

to the court

on an

agreed statement of facts, briefs, and an oral argument. Peter Sacks, in his brief for

had accepted in recomand towns in Massachucontrol not previously authorized, however limited in

the attorney general, essentially repeated the argument that he

mending
setts to

certification of the petition: that

adopt a system of rent

by enabling
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all cities

Nw tnsUmd Journal of Public Policy
scope, the operation of the petition

was not restricted

not contain an excluded matter despite

its

municipalities with rent control systems.

ing the

and

The Boston law firm

Hill

& Barlow, represent-

countered by arguing that the effect of the petition was essentially local

city,

that the

and thus did
on Cambridge and the other

to particular localities

special impact

form of rent

control authorized for

all

Massachusetts municipalities was

"illusory."

Lead counsel for the Jillson interveners was the Boston firm of Sherburne. Powers
Needham, which, through its partner Philip S. Lapatin. regularly represents the
Greater Boston Real Estate Board. Working with this firm as a volunteer was Charles
<fc

Fried, a former solicitor general of the United States

Law

School,

now

and a professor

at the

a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,

Harvard

who was

a

The brief filed by this team of lawyers emphasized a
different from that adopted by Peter Sacks. Rent control, it

strong opponent of rent control.
line of reasoning entirely

was argued, is a matter of statewide, not local concern. This is the teaching of the 1970
Marshal House case referred to above, which ruled that the permission of the state
through enabling legislation was required before a municipality could adopt rent control.
The brief quoted from the court's opinion in that case.
It

cannot be said that rent control has only local consequences. Whether an emergency

exists in

one community may be affected by conditions in neighboring areas. Reguone community may have impact elsewhere on land use, new

lation of rents in

housing construction, the mortgage market, conveyancing practices, the adequacy

and use of recording systems, and other similar matters.

It

must follow, the brief argued,

that if rent control has such nonlocal consequences

as to require enabling legislation to adopt

process on the ground that

it

it, it

has only local

cannot be excluded from the

effect.

initiative

Sherburne, Powers, and Charles Fried

wTote,

It is

a strange kind of rachet that would require consent of the people of the

wealth as a whole before a locality
foreclose, in the
better of

it

name

may impose rent

may prove no more

rent control throughout the state, since

it

it

had previously been granted.

than that the legislature could have banned

does not address the further question whether,

in tight of the particular localities limitation for initiative petitions, the

be taken through the

Common-

would

of local autonomy, that same general authority from thinking

and withdrawing the consent wherever

This line of reasoning

control, but then that

initiative process.

But

it

same

action can

certainly offered the court an alternative

basis for sustaining the attorney general's certification without having to address the

troublesome issue of whether the limited form of rent control offered to municipalities
the petition was "illusory."
The case, argued before the court on May 5, 1994, was decided the following July
14. The court upheld the attorney general's certification, adopting the reasoning put
forth by Sherburne, Powers, and Charles Fried rather than that of Peter Sacks (Ash v.
Attorney General, 418 Mass. 344). The opinion of Chief Justice Paul J. Liacos for

by

the court concludes as follows:

The

rent control

in the

ban contained

in the act,

Commonwealth. Although

it

may

by

its

terms, applies to every municipahty

appear to be a purely local issue,
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it is

not

.

.

.

The Massachusetts Constitution (home

rule

amendment) has reserved

the

power

to

regulate the landlord-tenant relationship to the Legislature to the exclusion of municipal governments ...

program only when
pality.

It is

within the power of a municipality to enact a rent control

the Legislature has explicitly delegated that

Thus, rent control

is

an issue of Statewide concern

(p.

power

to the munici-

348).

follows from this reasoning that an initiative petition which did no more than ban

It

rent control in Massachusetts outright as

have been constitutional. The opinion

is

Jon Maddox's original draft had done, would

thus a glorious vindication of

Maddox*s

orig-

inal analysis.

The

Fall Election

Following

its

Campaign

success in the litigation to meet the requirements for the

signatures, but before the second

round of

first

round of signatures had been collected and while the

appeal from the attorney general's certification of the initiative petition was

still

pending, the Massachusetts Housing Coalition had begun preparation for the

paign for what was now to be called Question

had volunteered

to advise

expectation that

if

gies,

MHC

during

When

9.

its initial

political consultant

signature drive,

it

fall

cam-

Dennis Dyer

had been in the

the question reached the ballot bis firnL Northeast Legislative Strate-

would be retained

manage

to

the election campaign. In June 199-.

into a contract with the firm for this purpose. In

MHC

entered

August campaign headquarters were

established in Wakefield.

Dyer

is

an experienced political adviser

results of polling

would have

to

who knows

his business.

and focus groups were available, he knew

convey a positive message

own

to voters: the

Even before the
campaign

that a successful

MHC

resentment that the

was not transferable to an
electorate that had not endured the same experiences. It is a commonplace among
political professionals that voters on initiative questions, when in doubt tend to vote no
to do nothing
rather than take a chance on a yes vote. MHC's campaign had to
give the voters something on which they could vote yes. Dyer's skill was evident early,
when he persuaded his future clients to adopt a name containing a warm and positive
volunteers

felt

from

their

treatment under rent control

—

—

term

'

like

"homeowners" rather than a

were otherwise.

instincts of the volunteers

A telephone poll completed for the
important finding that
latter

could be

Ross Perot
campaign focused positively when the

libertarian slogan after the fashion of

A considerable part of Dyer's job was to keep the

campaign in the spring of 1994 produced the
likely to support rent control than men. The

women were more

moved by arguments

economics of rent control:

women

about protecting property" rights and about the bad

were more concerned about fairness and helping

people. This insight produced the central message that
paign: that rent control

is

Dyer conceived

for the

cam-

a well-intentioned but failed policy that unfairly benefits af-

owners of modest means struggling to r r
would correct this injustice. The libertarian call to get government out of people's homes would be sounded, but it would be secondary.
This message is clearly reflected in the literature developed for the campaign. The
principal handout told the stories of four small-property owners who had suffered under

fluent tenants at the expense of property
their mortgages.

A yes

vote

rent control. Barbara Pilgrim, an older black

valid husband,

was not permitted

woman who

supports herself and her in-

to collect rents that cover her

131

mortgage and other

;
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"even though," the handout says, "one of her tenants can afford to winter in Florida

and summer on the Cape." Another black woman, Val Jean Cox, was told

that she for-

exemption from rent control for her owner-occupied, three-family house when

feited the

she had to move out temporarily to stay with her gravely ill mother in another city.
Vinny Bologna and his young family were not permitted to live in a house he had renovated, but instead "they are crowded into [a] one-bedroom apartment and forced to rent
out the house." Helen and Peter Petrillo were told that they had lost their exemption

owner-occupied building when they allowed their daughter and her

as a three-family,

family to

move

in after their daughter's

house burned down. The photographs of these

property owners that accompanied their stories gave, as Denise Jillson said, "a face

and heart

to the

campaign." This handout material was included, with more

the effects of rent control, in the press kits that went to

media

detail

editorial boards all

on
over

the state.

The libertarian emphasis was used mainly in visual material, where the more extenmessage of fairness was not feasible. Thus there were bumper stickers showing
a house in black and white with a red legend over it saying "Get Gov't Out." The campaign was able to make particularly effective use of yard signs in the same format,
which were placed in large numbers throughout the state with the help of the industry's
sive

extensive network of realtors and small-property owners.

The campaign could not

afford statewide mailings, but representatives attended reg-

state, and material was handed
would permit at shopping malls and other
usually with the persuasive
venues where large crowds gather. Meetings were held
Jillson present
with the editorial boards and key reporters of newspapers throughout
the state. In the end, of all the state's newspapers, only The Boston Globe and The
Patriot Ledger opposed Question 9.
Only limited use could be made of the electronic media for lack of funds, but Dyer
made the most of what he had. Media advertisements were carefully targeted to programs known to be watched by women. Dyer knew that money spent on talk show hosts
like Jerry Williams, who were addressing an audience already likely to support Question
9, was largely wasted. He is critical of a Boston-based group supporting Question 9
for having spent a large amount of money for this purpose that could in his view have

ular meetings of small-property

owners throughout the

out as widely as the corps of volunteers

—

—

been used

to better effect.

Dyer believes

that

when

the theme of a

campaign has been

established,

it

should be

repeated over and over again without deviation. Changing the message causes confusion

among

voters and invites the

no vote

that they tend to cast

when they

are unsure.

The

schedule of campaign activities was set up in advance on a day-by-day basis, and Dyer
insisted that

it

be adhered

straints. Jillson

was

to, subject

only to modifications required by financial con-

entirely convinced that Dyer's strategy

and methods were

right,

but

many of her MHC colleagues were not. Some thought the campaign literature was too
weak in failing to attack prominent and well-compensated people who live in rentcontrolled apartments, like Cambridge mayor Kenneth Reeves. Others bridled at the
Dyer imposed and thought him a petty dictator. During the campaign, the regSunday evening informational meetings of volunteers became what Thayer calls

discipline

ular

therapy sessions, as he and Jillson worked to keep the campaign in line with Dyer's
strategy.

They were rewarded by a narrow victory on November 8, when Question 9 carried
by 1,034,594 votes to 980,723, or 51 percent to 49 percent. The question

the state
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was defeated

in

Cambridge, by 58 percent

about 4,800 votes.

It

won

especially Middlesex,

50,000.
the

42 percent, and

fared worst in the western counties,

It

in

Boston, but only by

where Boston's suburban voters delivered a

campaign message

On

to

in the other large counties in the eastern part

to

whose

of the

state,

plurality of almost

distance from Boston caused

be diluted.

election night a potluck supper

was arranged

at the

VFW Post on

Huron Avenue,

where volunteers could follow the returns on television. By midnight victory seemed
assured, and most went home to bed. But some stayed on until all the returns were
in,

then celebrated by forming a small caravan to drive by the houses of Cambridge

Civic Association city councillors and blow their car horns.

MHC's

Resources

The success of Question 9

at

the polls

a brief look at the resources that
in order. First,

money.

made

is

not the end of the story, but before

it

possible for

MHC to achieve

its

it

continues,

victory

is

MHC raised and spent something over a million dollars, of which

about 60 percent was spent on the Question 9 campaign in the summer and fall of 1994.
The balance went largely to the expenses of the first signature campaign in the fall of

1993 (primarily the fees and expenses of National Voter Outreach) and the
followed

it

litigation that

While about 75
implying wide grassroots support,

(primarily the fees of counsel and handwriting experts).

percent of the contributions amounted to $300 or

less,

the financial reports filed suggest that the real estate industry probably

accounted for

more than 75 percent of the dollars.
Real estate money was less important during the first signature drive. The Greater
Boston Real Estate Board and its Rental Housing Association each contributed $25,000
to this effort,

and the Massachusetts Association of Realtors underwrote expenses of

about $10,000. But some $70,000 came from other sources,
butions and loans from

SPOA members

much

and supporters. After

of

it

in small contri-

this drive,

however, even

before the successful conclusion of the litigation establishing additional signatures, the
real estate industry supplied

imately $500,000

managers

fifty trade organizations

in contributions of $4,000 or

come from
There

most of the money. The financial records show

came from some

more. At least half again that amount must have

similar sources in smaller contributions.

no question

is

tion 9 (the

that approx-

and property owners and

that such financial support

was

essential to the success of

Cambridge-based opponents of Question 9 appear

to

Ques-

have raised and spent

but it would be a serious mistake to believe that money alone proThe indispensable ingredient was the corps of volunteers and their
leaders. By the end of the campaign the network of volunteers was statewide
some
recruited in parts of the state far from Cambridge by the leadership of the Massachusetts
Rental Housing Association. But from the beginning and throughout, the core was in

less than $200,000),

duced the

result.

Cambridge.

It is

—

obviously not possible in a narrative of this kind to identify

volunteers and their activities. But

some

With limited exceptions, these people did not belong

to the ranks of the

and professionals who, drawn by Harvard, MIT, and the other educational

the key

academics
institutions of

came to Cambridge from elsewhere and constitute the backbone of the
Most of them never supported CCA candidates. In the great divide
has characterized Cambridge politics since long before rent control came to the city,

greater Boston,

CCA constituency.
that

all

generalizations are possible.

these people are the so-called independents.
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Many

of these volunteers had had unhappy personal experiences with rent control.
what
angered and galvanized all of them was what they universally perceived as
But
condescending indifference to their concerns by CCA city councillors and by the city's
rent control apparatus and advocates for tenants, many of them students working in
university-funded clinical programs. The resentment these people felt led to astonishing

volunteer

efforts.

By

the end of the campaign, they had

in a camaraderie that

Denise

Jillson

was

leader, contributed

is

become a

disciplined army,

and bound together by the emotions of a shared experience

fiercely loyal to their cause

palpable to the observer.

the army's leader. Douglas Thayer,

much

whom

she identifies as a co-

to the Question 9 effort through his dedication,

and experience and contacts in the

real estate industry, but

he

is

the

good judgment,
acknowledge

first to

primary role. Jillson is a person of strong resolve and focus in her causes,
which she pursues with calm persistence. Amy Miller, the very capable reporter for the
Cambridge Chronicle, has written of her that she has "that kind of gentle voice that
builds bridges." 8 She seems wholly without vanity. When a group of her colleagues gave
her birthday presents in the winter of 1 994, she wrote them a note in which she said,
"I should be thanking you for entrusting me with a wonderful and important project.
Remember, when we win, it belongs to everybody." She was careful to communicate
with her troops. The regular Sunday evening meetings that took place throughout the
campaign were well attended. Only at the end, when events were unfolding very fast on
Beacon Hill and timely communication was not feasible, was there some erosion of
confidence. Jillson's performance was extraordinary. The success of Question 9 could
not have been achieved without her.

Jillson' s

.

The

.

.

Constitutional Challenge to the Ballot Procedure

The approval of Question 9 by

the voters

was not the end of the 1994

activity relating to

rent control. Before the 1994 legislative session ended, the legislature passed

and the

governor signed a measure that protected disadvantaged tenants for a limited time
January

1,

after

1995. But before examining this development, a look at a legal challenge to

the constitutionality of the ballot procedure itself is in order, since the

challenge affected what was happening on

The Massachusetts Constitution
summary
of

"[a] fair, concise

.

.

.

.

as
.

.

it

Beacon

pendency of this

Hill.

relates to initiative petitions provides that

each law submitted to the people, shall be printed

on the ballot." A form of ballot is included which says, "Do you approve of a law
summarized below?" followed by boxes for a yes or no vote; and below that are the
words "(Set forth summary here)." 9 When this language came into the constitution,
Massachusetts voters marked printed paper ballots. In more recent years, however, vot-

kinds:

become

They

are of

machines on which the voter expresses a choice by pushing a

lever;

ing machines have

two basic

the norm, especially in larger municipalities.

and electronic voting systems, by which choices are expressed by marks read by optical
scanning devices, or on punch cards, either directly or through marking units that cannot be removed from the voting booth.

To meet

the constitutional requirement of a fair

summary

was not

feasible to include a

for initiative questions

printed on the ballot for

authorized, when it
summary on a voting machine, to prepare separate ballots
on which the summary could appear. But this eliminated the

questions offered by initiative petition, the secretary of state
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was

advantages of faster tabulation made possible by voting machines, so in 1994 the legislature

amended

When

the law to read as follows:

the state secretary shall determine that

it is

not feasible for die

summary of any

question or questions submitted to the people to appear on the voting machine, he
shall prepare separate sheets of

for each polling place

.

.

.

paper containing such summary and provide such sheets

and one such sheet shall be furnished to each voter as he

10
prepares to cast his vote by the use of such a machine.

The obvious question

is

whether

this

procedure conforms to the requirements of the

constitution.

On November

29, 1994, a group of registered voters filed suit in the Massachusetts

Superior Court alleging that the procedure does not so conform. The court was asked
to declare the vote

on

all

the ballot questions null and void and, pending final decision,

from certifying the

to restrain the secretary of state

questions, including Question

9.

results of certain of the ballot

Judge Hiller B. Zobel entered such a restraining order,

accompanied by a brief opinion expressing his belief that the plaintiffs had a strong
An appeal was immediately taken by the secretary of state to the Massachusetts

case.

Appeals Court, which

left the restraining

order in effect as to Question

then proceeded to the Supreme Judicial Court. There Justice Herbert

P.

9.

The case

Wilkins also

effect. The case was argued before that court on
December 27 the court announced, without opinion, its decision
in favor of the secretary of state. The court's written opinion by Justice Wilkins explaining its reasons followed on March 9, 1995 (Tobias v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 665). In it the court declined to be bound to a literal reading of the

continued the restraining order in

December

22, and on

constitution, finding instead that the procedure prescribed "fulfils the basic purpose

of having each voter capable of informing

which

that voter

may

vote"

The outcome was not a
that transitional legislation

(p.

him or

herself concerning the questions on

676).

no one could be certain of it during the weeks
was pending on Beacon Hill. Judge Zobel' s opinion had

surprise, but

looked strongly in the other direction, and as will be clear to any reader of the opinion
of the Supreme Judicial Court, the court had to repudiate earlier decisions of

its

own

that interpreted the ballot provisions of the constitution very narrowly. This uncertainty

influenced legislative strategy on both sides.

law proposed by Question 9 were lost by an adverse court decision in the balwould be no law to override the Cambridge rent control statute unless the
legislature passed one. The supporters of Question 9 knew that if they could get transitional rent control legislation acceptable to them, Cambridge's existing rent control system would be at an end whatever happened in the ballot case. This was an important
part of their motivation in seeking such legislation.
If the

lot case, there

The Passage

of Transitional Legislation

During the summer and

fall

rental properties that

able tenants

new

if

some

November 8 vote on Question 9
among responsible owners and managers

of 1994, as the

approached, a consensus was developing
transitional

arrangements would be needed

Question 9 passed. As early as July, the Alliance for Change, the

political organization offering

of

to protect vulnercity's

an alternative to the Cambridge Civic Association
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and reflecting the views of the city's real estate interests, had proposed the establishment of a city-funded rent subsidy program to "provide housing subsidies for lowerincome and el-derly rent control tenants adversely affected by any change to our current
rent control system." This was to be accompanied by a "pledge" by landlords to disadvantaged tenants that rent increases would not exceed inflation while such a program
was being put into effect. A rent subsidy program and the accompanying pledge never
materialized, but the fears of responsible representatives of the real estate industry
that

—

an irresponsible minority would promptly evict low-income and elderly tenants,

sisted,

—

widespread media attention with unpredictable political consequences

attracting

and other means of preventing

this

per-

were considered.

and Thayer were aware of and sympathetic to this thinking, but as the propowould for all practical purposes have terminated rent

Jillson

nents of a ballot question that

Cambridge

control in

they were careful to distance the Massachusetts Housing

entirely,

Meanwhile it was necessary to prepare
MHC, which had been created to raise
and expend funds for the initiative petition, could not legally do the same for this legislative activity. MHC's continued existence could be for no purpose other than to
Coalition from any proposals resulting from

knew

for the legislative activity they

it.

lay ahead.

A new organization called Massachusetts Homeowners Coalition II
was formed to raise and expend funds for the upcoming legislative effort.

retire its debt.

(MHC
It

II),

ultimately raised about $80,000, which

it

spent primarily on the fees of consultants

and lobbyists. Dennis Dyer's firm was kept on
Boston lobbying firm of Coyne, Kennedy

— was

retained.

as counsel for

William McDermott,

MHC

II.

&

to supervise legislative strategy.

Kerr

MHC's

— William Coyne was

The

key player

counsel in the signature litigation, acted

and Thayer were ready with

Jillson

the

their

team of advisers when

the legislative phase began.

On November 20,
Council passed a

after

home

more than

a

week of turmoil

at

City Hall, the Cambridge City

rule petition asking the legislature to extend, with certain ex-

ceptions, the protection of rent control for five years in units occupied by elderly tenants

and families with children whose income did not exceed 90 percent of the median for
the Boston metropolitan area.

maximum
high.

The

MHC II did not like this proposal for several reasons. The

tenant income requirement for continued protection was, they thought, too
five-year period

was too

long.

And

the petition had been carefully drafted to

permit the city council to reimpose the existing rent control system
nullified in the
priority

was

pending ballot

if

Question 9 were

MHC's

first transitional

Cambridge proposal. This was accomplished when the proposal
Senate by only two votes and was vetoed by the governor.

to kill the

passed in the state
It

any other reason.

litigation or for

was then time

on December

for the real estate interests to put forward their

16, 1994,

own

proposal, and

Robert L. Nash, the executive vice president of the Massa-

chusetts Association of Realtors, sent

Governor Weld

draft legislation that

would have

extended rent control protection to tenants with incomes of not more than 60 percent
of the median for the Boston metropolitan area through 1995 for condominiums

and units
ject to

in buildings with three units or less

as such into the legislature, but
tate industry in the negotiations

The

and through 1996 for

all

other units, sub-

vacancy decontrol in the meantime. The Nash proposal was never introduced
it

set forth the basic position

position of tenant advocates

representative John E.

Supreme

of

MHC

II

and the

real es-

with tenant advocates that followed.

was expressed in a bill introduced in the House by
passed by it on December 27, the day the

McDonough and

Judicial Court

announced

its

decision upholding the constitutionality of the
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ballot procedure. This measure,

the

McDonough

bill,

differed

extended rent control protection

more

and, far

significantly,

to all tenants sixty-two

it

which participants

in the negotiations referred to as

from the Nash proposal
to certain categories

in

two important

of tenants

respects:

in all units for

it

two years

extended protection not only to low-income tenants but

and over and disabled tenants regardless of income. These

differ-

ences became the battleground in the negotiations that followed.

Before the differences were resolved, there were other developments that together
created the complex and dramatic environment in which their resolution took place.
first

of these was a revolt

among some of the SPOA

aware of the desire within the
tect vulnerable tenants if

to

which

Jillson

December,

who

real estate industry for transitional

arrangements to pro-

allied

MHC II with industry efforts to that end. In late
MHC II

with Dennis Dyer and the lobbyists and lawyers for

had been participating with representatives of the

real estate industry in necessarily

confidential strategy sessions and in negotiations with tenant advocates, felt she

give

SPOA an idea

The

These people had been

Question 9 prevailed, but they had not realized the extent

and Thayer had

Jillson,

leadership.

of what was going on.

When

she did so,

some of SPOA's

had

to

leaders,

Maddox, and David and Aline Sullivan, who
compromise when total victory had been won at the polls, were
angry at what they viewed as Jillson's secretive collaboration with the enemy. Throughout the final legislative negotiations, Jillson had to fight a rearguard action against those
who had been her closest allies.
Circumstances were further complicated by what was going on in the Supreme Judicial Court. The court had ruled on December 27 that the ballot procedure established
for the initiative questions was legal, but it had been careful to state that the ruling did
not extend to the question of whether the procedure had in fact been followed. The
plaintiffs in the case asserted that they could show departures from the prescribed procedure (for example, failure to furnish a copy of the separate printed summary to every
voter) widespread enough to cast doubt on the outcome of certain ballot questions where
the result was close, including Question 9. They wanted a trial on these issues, and
including cochairperson Linda Levine, Jon

saw no reason

for any

they asked the court to continue in effect the restraining order against the implementation of Question

9

until

such a

could be completed, possibly a matter of several

trial

months.
In considering the issuance of a restraining order of this kind, a court weighs the

moving party's success at trial against prejudice to the other party if
On December 29, Justice Wilkins, aware of the legislative process in
progress on Beacon Hill, extended the restraining order through January 3, the last day
likelihood of the

the order

is

issued.

of the legislative session, noting that "the plaintiffs have a

difficult,

but not impossible,

task of demonstrating that departures from the prescribed procedures
likely to

have affected the result of Question 9."

were reasonably

No one knew what Justice Wilkins

would do if the question of extending the order came before him again after the legislature had failed to act, but it was certainly possible that the proponents of Question 9
could be facing a long delay in its implementation and the prospect, however unlikely,
that it would be nullified altogether. These risks increased the pressure on them to
accept a legislative solution.

One

endgame on Beacon Hill. Governor Weld had
bill if it was backed by the interests that
These interests, spoken for by Nash and Jillson, promptly

further event influenced the

originally signaled support for the

had supported Question

made

it

clear that the

9.

McDonough

McDonough
bill

did not have their support, and the governor
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stated publicly that he
satisfied, I

So

am

this is

would not sign any measure

satisfied,"

he

said. "I

am

that they did not accept. "If they are

where matters stood as the participants entered the

legislative session.

On

11

almost a spectator here."

final

days of the 1994

the one hand, the real estate interests did not have the votes in

Nash proposal; on the other hand, the governor had promised
Thus each side could prevent the enactment of a law unacceptable to it, but neither had the power to achieve acceptable legislation without the
cooperation of the other. Yet both sides had reason to want a legislative solution. The
real estate interests still feared possible abuses by irresponsible landlords, with attendant
publicity and resulting political risk; and the threat of continuation of the ballot litigation persisted. Tenant interests wished to protect vulnerable tenants from the threat of
the legislature to pass the
to veto the

McDonough

bill.

sudden rent increases and evictions.
This complex situation worked

itself

out over the

of 1995. Progress was slow until Tuesday, January

3,

last

days of 1994 and the

session. Negotiations continued all through the afternoon

resentative

McDonough was

and evening of that

the principal participant on behalf of tenants.

actors for the landlord interests

first

1995, the last day of the legislative
day.

The

Rep-

central

were Nash and Edward Shanahan, representing the
Coyne and William

principal real estate trade organizations, Lapatin as their counsel,

MHC II and the town of Brookline,
The evening grew later, and failure seemed likely. But as midnight neared, agreement was reached.
On the crucial issue of the required income level for elderly and disabled tenants,
the negotiators split the difference: income of not more than 80 percent of the median
for the Boston area would be required for protected status. The landlord interests got
what they wanted on the issue of time limits, more in the case of small owner-occupied
buildings than in the Nash proposal. The protected categories of tenants would enjoy
Delaney,

Jr.,

the lobbyists representing, respectively,

and of course,

Jillson.

continued rent control through 1995

if

they lived in a condominium, in a building with

three units or less, or in an owner-occupied building with

than twelve units. Protection would expire for

all

more than

three but not

more

other units at the end of 1996. During

the period of protection, landlords could raise rents

by 5 percent a year and could

any event collect as rent up to 30 percent of the combined incomes of

all

in

persons resid-

ing in a unit. All other forms of rent control were prohibited.

At two minutes before midnight, the president of the Senate brought down
to

his gavel

complete the enactment process, and the following morning Governor Weld signed

the

compromise
and towns

cities

acceptance.

It

into
in

law as Chapter 282 of the Acts of 1994. The

statute applied to all

Massachusetts having rent control without the necessity of local

superseded the law enacted by Question

9,

and thus made academic the

pending case involving the ballot procedure.

There were many people observing the drama in the State House

most of the
After

all

original signers of the initiative petition,

whom

Jillson

that night, including

had asked

to

come.

the emotion, they were slow to drift out into the clear, crisp winter night, and

it

was almost one o'clock before Jillson left. She and Salim Kabawat had been offered a
ride to Cambridge by Dennis Dyer. As he went out to bring around his car, they lingered, tired but satisfied in the warm glow of the State House, sitting on a landing of the
chandeliered marble staircase that leads from the upper floors of the building to the
lobby. A woman neither of them knew passed them, walking down. At the next landing
she looked back and asked, "Denise Jillson?" Jillson nodded. The woman said nothing
more, but turned and continued down the staircase.
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The Aftermath
There

is

universal agreement

Cambridge
city's

that

it

among

those knowledgeable about housing policy in

will be years before the full effect of the repeal of rent control

housing profile and demography

some
summary of them.

early consequences

after the repeal,

First, the effect

is clear.

By

on the

the end of 1995, however, a year

were apparent, and

account closes with a

this

of the transitional legislation. In early 1995, the Cambridge Rent

Control Board invited tenants entitled to do so to establish so-called protected status by
filing a

form verifying

board's records

show

their

income

level and, if applicable, age

and

disability.

The

end of 1 994, when rent control ended, there were ap-

that at the

proximately 16,200 controlled units in Cambridge.

As of December

31, 1995, tenants in

only 1,523 of these units (9.4%) had established protected status.

No

one

is

limit is strict.

quite sure

why

this

number

is

elderly or disabled). For a family of four the limit
is

only $30,800 ($39,900

widely assumed that
it

if

many

To be

so low.

For a tenant occupying a unit alone

any family member

is

it is

sure, the

income

$21 ,550 ($27,950

on the income of

all

if

eligibility

the tenant

family

is

members

elderly or disabled). Moreover,

it

is

tenants entitled to protected status did not bother to establish

because their landlords did not raise their rents beyond the modest levels permitted by

Chapter 282. But even with these explanations, the dramatically low percentage of for-

merly controlled units whose tenants established protected status gives credence to the
assertion of opponents of rent control that

it

had become an entitlement program for

middle- and upper-income tenants.

The end of rent

control

prompted the

city to

review

its

existing housing programs to

determine whether additional initiatives should be undertaken. For

community development department has administered programs
available for low- and

moderate-income

rehabilitation of substandard properties

from the

city.

partially with

many

years the city's

to increase

housing

residents, primarily through the acquisition

by not-for-profit

entities

and

with financial support

These programs have been financed largely with federal funds, but

moneys contributed by

the city in the

form of

fines collected in rent

control enforcement proceedings and, to a limited extent, budget appropriations. Total

expenditures have amounted to

some $2

million a year and resulted in adding fifty to

one hundred units a year to the affordable housing stock.
In the spring of 1995 the city council approved a recommendation

manager

that

an additional $2 million be appropriated for

this

by the

city

purpose in each of the

community development department stepped up efforts
become home buyers through financial counseling, encouraging loans
from Cambridge banks on favorable terms and in some cases assisting with closing
next ten years. In addition, the

to help tenants to

and rehabilitation costs. In the municipal election campaign in the fall of 1995, it
became apparent that some city councillors were prepared to support the expenditure
of substantially more city money
for housing
as much as $10 million a year

—

—

purposes.

The fall election provided the first indication of the effect of the end of rent control
on the city's politics. In the 1990s the CCA has been the dominant force, regularly
electing

its

endorsed candidates as a majority of the city council by comfortable

margins. After the 1993 election, the

Mayor Reeves from

the

non-CCA

councillors had caused the defection of

CCA by joining with him to elect him as

CCA councillor Jonathan

Myers did not seek

reelection.
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many
CCA's

who had

with the expectation that

tenants

had

rival, the

left

the

endorsed by

city,

led the

supported CCA-endorsed candidates

Alliance for Change, to believe that a candidate

could win the seat vacated by Myers. The presence in the race on the

it

Alliance ticket of James C.

McSweeney, who had come

closest of all the defeated

it was not to be. Myers's seat
was handily won by CCA-endorsed candidate Henrietta Davis, a four-term member of
the school committee, making her first run for the city council. The total vote was down
from 1993 by more than 13 percent, but the CCA incumbents, excluding Reeves, who
ran without endorsement from either the Alliance or the CCA, received 17 percent more
number one votes than in the prior election. Fewer votes transferred from defeated
CCA-endorsed candidates were therefore needed by them to reach the quota required
under the city's proportional representation system, making more transfers available
for Davis. The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the end of rent control does
not seem to have altered significantly the political profile of Cambridge.
Finally, as 1995 came to an end, an attempt to reverse the effect of Question 9 by
putting rent control on the ballot again in the 1996 state election expired with no more
than a whimper. In August the attorney general was persuaded to certify as complying
with the state constitution a measure entitled "Community Empowerment Act," which
authorized among many other things the imposition of rent control by municipalities.
Proponents of Question 9 filed suit challenging the certification on the grounds that the

candidates to election in 1993, encouraged this belief. But

constitution does not permit an initiative petition to appear on the ballot if

it

proposes a

measure "substantially the same as any measure which has been qualified for submission or submitted to the people at either of the

two preceding biennial

state elections."

12

But the lawsuit became moot when the proponents of the Community Empowerment
meaningful signature drive and did not submit any signatures to
by the December 6 filing deadline.
The collapse of this effort seemed almost an anticlimax, for rent control, which had
dominated political debate in Cambridge since 1970, had already virtually disappeared
as a political issue in the city in the aftermath of Question 9. There was no mention
of it in the platform of the CCA in the fall election, and it was largely ignored by the

Act

failed to organize a

the secretary of state

candidates. This sudden silence

mony

— astonishing,

that surrounded the issue for so

many

really, in light

years

— suggests

of the high-decibel

acri-

that the supporters of

rent control are, for the foreseeable future at least, content to accept its repeal.
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